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ABSTRACT 
 
Drawing on agency theory, this paper investigates the determinants of voluntary audit 
committee (AC) formation among non-bank firms listed on the Palestine Stock Exchange 
(PSE). We used the annual reports of nearly all non-bank companies listed on the PSE as 
well as the company guides issued by the PSE for the period between 2010 and 2012. 
Logistic regression analysis was performed to identify the influence of a set of corporate 
governance mechanisms, ownership structures and company characteristics on the 
voluntary formation of ACs among non-bank Palestinian firms. The result of the analysis 
demonstrated that the AC is influenced by foreign ownership, institutional ownership, 
board diligence and external auditor type. This paper adds to the limited AC literature in 
Middle Eastern countries in general and in the Arab World in particular. This paper not 
only examines the determinants of the voluntary formation of ACs but also attempts to 
theorise about this formation. 
 
Keywords: audit committee (AC), corporate governance, ownership structure, Palestine 
Stock Exchange 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent accounting scandals and large corporate fraud cases in the early 2000s 
have signalled the existence of serious flaws in corporate governance systems 
worldwide. These events have resulted in an increased focus on the need for more 
robust regulations and mechanisms to enhance corporate governance practices to 
minimise corporate risks and to instil transparency between company 
management and shareholders. Many countries have taken steps to introduce a 
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number of governance mechanisms for adoption by companies to ensure that the 
management agents (managers) are acting in the best interests of the principals 
(shareholders). The audit committee (AC) is one of these important governance 
mechanisms. The AC assists the board of directors with its duties overseeing the 
firm's financial reporting, internal control and audit requirements (Chen, Lin, & 
Lin, 2008; Sharma, Naiker, & Lee, 2009). According to Fearnley and Beattie 
(2004), the AC acts as a mediator between a firm’s board of directors, 
management and external auditors. The existence of an AC is expected to reduce 
information asymmetry (Chung, Charoenwong, & Ding, 2004), mitigate agency 
costs (Reddy, Locke, & Scrimgeour, 2010) and improve the information flow 
between company managers and shareholders (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2007). 
 
 The role of an AC in strengthening corporate governance and its 
determinants has been of interest to accounting researchers in developed 
countries (Goddard & Masters, 2000; Chen et al., 2008; Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson, & Neal, 2009; Bédard & Gendron, 2010). A limited number of 
studies, however, have examined the role of the AC as a corporate governance 
mechanism in small emerging economies, especially those characterised by an 
unstable political and economic environment. This study has two main 
objectives. The first objective is to examine the underlying determinants that may 
influence the voluntary formation of ACs in non-bank firms listed on the 
Palestine Stock Exchange (PSE) between the years 2010–2012. The second 
objective is to evaluate the appropriateness of agency theory for explaining 
variations in the voluntary establishment of ACs among the studied companies.  
 
We believe that Palestine, as an emerging economy, offers interesting 
and unique political, economic and cultural features different from those of other 
developed and emerging economies.  
 
One of the distinguishing features of the Palestinian business 
environment is the high degree of political and economic uncertainty and the lack 
of control over major economic and fiscal policy instruments. The Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) was formed in 1994, pursuant to the Oslo Accords 
between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel, as a five-year 
transitional authority. Following the creation of the PNA, the Palestine Securities 
Exchange (PSE) was founded as a privately owned exchange in 1995, and it held 
its first trading session early in 1997. One of the PSE’s key objectives was to 
develop domestic investments and facilitate foreign investment by providing a 
safe trading environment characterised by efficiency, fairness and transparency. 
However, since the five-year transitional period ended without reaching a 
comprehensive peace agreement, the Palestinian Territories (West Bank and 
Gaza Strip) have experienced extreme levels of political instability and violence. 
In a very unstable, uncertain economic and financial environment such as 
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Palestine, firms become more prone to agency problems, which are expected to 
have negative consequences on the performance of the stock market and to result 
in the loss of domestic and foreign investor confidence. Instead, the PSE has 
developed remarkably in terms of the number of firms listed, total market 
capitalisation and the percentages of both foreign and institutional ownership. 
The number of companies listed in the market has increased from 8 in 1997, with 
a market capitalisation not exceeding $530 million, to 48 companies with a total 
market capitalisation of approximately $2.86 billion by the end of 2012.   
 
Another distinguishing institutional feature of the Palestinian business 
environment is the firm ownership structure. The difference in firm ownership 
and firm control is one of the primary differences between various countries' 
corporate governance systems. Within the context of Palestine, there are two 
types of controlling shareholders of listed firms, namely foreign and institutional 
shareholders. By the end of 2012, 41% and 36% of the total shares in the PSE 
were owned by foreign and institutional investors, respectively. These indicators 
reflect that the PSE has managed to attract, absorb, and retain considerable 
amounts of foreign and institutional investments despite extreme economic and 
political instability. As such, these classes of investors are expected to become 
increasingly involved in corporate governance (including AC formation) through 
their ability to influence decision making. 
 
Based on the above-mentioned arguments, the current study provides an 
opportunity to investigate the role of audit committee establishment in a context 
in which political instability and agency conflicts are very high and ownership 
structure is different from that in other developed and emerging economies. To 
the best of the researchers' knowledge, no research to date has specifically 
addressed the AC's role in a Palestinian context. This study will benefit policy 
makers and the Palestinian Capital Market Authority (PCMA) by elucidating the 
status and the limitations of the current corporate governance code. In addition, 
the researchers are motivated to help expand the very limited existing research on 
an environment characterised by severe political and economic circumstances 
and a lack of control over major economic and fiscal policy instruments. 
 
In line with the above objectives, this study endeavours to answer the 
following fundamental research question: Does the voluntary formation of audit 
committees in a high agency cost environment such as Palestine complement 
other corporate governance measures (board characteristics, quality of the 
external auditor and ownership structure) in reducing agency problems? To 
answer this question, agency theory is employed to identify the determinants of 
AC formation among non-bank firms listed on the PSE. According to agency 
theory, the formation of ACs is considered to be a reaction to information 
asymmetry between a company’s owners and its management (Köhler, 2005). 
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Agency theory is the prevailing theoretical framework used to investigate the 
determinants of AC establishment and has been extensively used in the literature 
(Bradbury, 1990; Collier, 1993; Menon & Williams, 1994; Firth, Fung, & Rui, 
2007).  
 
 The rest of this paper is organised as follows. A brief overview of the 
corporate governance environment in the Palestinian Territories is presented in 
the following section. A review of the literature on the voluntary formation of 
ACs together with hypotheses development is offered in the subsequent section. 
The research methodology used in the study is discussed in section 3. Study 
findings are discussed in section 4, and the conclusion is presented in the last 
section of the paper. 
 
Corporate Governance Environment in Palestine 
 
The governance structure for financial regulation and supervision in Palestine 
falls under the jurisdiction of two authorities: the Palestine Monetary Authority 
(PMA) and the Palestine Capital Market Authority (PCMA). PMA was 
established in 1995 as an independent public institution to assist in maintaining 
the stability and effectiveness of the Palestinian financial system through 
prudential regulation and supervision in line with international best practices. The 
PCMA was established in 2005 as the regulator for the non-banking financial 
sectors. The PCMA oversees and regulates the securities market, insurance 
companies and real-estate institutions, while the PMA is responsible for banks, 
money exchangers and microfinance institutions. In 2009, each authority issued 
its own code of good corporate governance. While the PCMA's "Code of 
Corporate Governance in Palestine" applies to all firms with securities listed on 
the Palestine Stock Exchange (PSE), the PMA's "Corporate Governance Code for 
Banks" applies to the banking sector. The two codes are largely based on 
international standards. Both codes contain mandatory requirements that firms 
must adhere to along with additional guidelines representing good practices that 
are encouraged but not required. The PCMA code only encourages listed 
companies to form ACs (the dependent variable in our model) to ensure 
transparency of the company accounts and to inform stakeholders of the degree 
of risk facing the company. However, the PMA has adopted stricter standards for 
audit committees. The PMA code requires all banks to establish ACs comprising 
at least three nonexecutive board members with appropriate banking and 
financial expertise.  
 
The PCMA's code addresses five fundamental aspects of the AC: general 
committee meetings, shareholders' compatible rights, corporate management, 
auditing, and disclosure and transparency. The relevant elements in the PCMA 
code include the following: 
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1. The code requires the board of directors in public shareholding firms to have 
between five and eleven members. 
2. The code recommends having two board directors as independent members.  
3. The code recommends that the board director not be involved in the firm's 
executive functions to maintain the distribution of authority and 
responsibility as well as to ensure better accountability. 
4. The code requires shareholders to select the external auditors during their 
annual meeting based on the recommendation from the board of directors and 
the AC and to approve their fees. The external auditors should be licensed, 
independent of their clients and possessed of adequate professional 
competence for the tasks required. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
The role of the audit committee (AC) as a corporate governance mechanism has 
received considerable research attention over the past few decades in countries 
with different legal and regulatory frameworks for corporate governance. Groff 
and Valentinčič (2011) classified the empirical AC literature into two main areas. 
The first area includes studies that assessed the determinants of voluntary AC 
formation (Bradbury, 1990; Collier, 1993; Menon & Williams, 1994; Deli & 
Gillan, 2000; Carson; 2002; Piot, 2004; Firth et al., 2007). Three main categories 
of determinants influencing the establishment of a voluntary AC have emerged 
from these studies: (i) firm characteristics, including variables such as firm size 
and leverage (Bradbury; 1990; Collier, 1993; Adams, 1997) and (ii) board 
structure, including variables such as board size (Bradbury, 1990), board 
independence (Pincus, Rusbarsky, & Wong, 1989; Collier, 1993; Chau & Leung, 
2006), external audit quality (Eichenseher & Shields, 1985; Pincus et al., 1989; 
Bradbury, 1990; Collier, 1993) and the influence of ownership structure 
(Bradbury, 1990; Collier, 1993; Chau & Leung, 2006). The second area of AC 
research includes studies focused on factors affecting the quality and 
effectiveness of the AC. This stream of research assumes that the mere formation 
of an AC does not necessarily mean that it functions properly or achieves a 
particular governance outcome (Turley & Zaman, 2004; Firth et al., 2007).  
 
AC effectiveness has been measured by various proxies such as AC size 
(Krishnan, 2005; Bronson, Carcello, & Raghunandan, 2006), AC independence 
(Krishnan, 2005; Bronson et al., 2006; Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 2007), the financial 
expertise of the committee members (Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007) and 
committee diligence (Willekens, Bauwhede, & Gaeremynck, 2004; Turley & 
Zaman, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009; Greco, 2011). The majority of prior studies 
used agency theory to investigate the determinants of the voluntary formation of 
an AC (Bradbury, 1990; Collier, 1993; Menon & Williams, 1994; Piot, 2004; 
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Firth et al., 2007). Drawing on agency theory, the current study expands the 
literature by examining the selected factors hypothesised to influence the 
voluntary formation of ACs in Palestine. These factors and the rationale behind 
including them in the study are discussed below. 
 
Board Characteristics 
 
The board of directors is viewed as one of the most important internal corporate 
governance mechanisms for reducing the agency problems arising from the 
separation of ownership and management (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Belkhir, 2009). 
According to agency theory, hired managers may use the firm's resources to 
satisfy their personal interests, which may differ from the owners' interests 
(Oyejide & Soyibo, 2001). Thus, to minimise agency conflict between managers 
and owners, the board of directors is expected to serve as a guardian of the 
owners' interests (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008). Prior studies have identified 
several features of the board of directors that are likely to influence its 
effectiveness in monitoring management and improving the quality of corporate 
reporting and performance. These features include board size, board 
independence, and the frequency of board meetings (Karamanou & Vafeas, 
2005).  
 
Many researchers have argued that larger boards are less effective in their 
monitoring function due to communication and coordination difficulties that may 
arise between members (Yawson, 2006; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010). These 
problems increase the conflict between board members and decrease board 
efficiency. Thus, ACs may provide a monitoring mechanism that reduces high 
agency costs. Menon and Williams (1994) documented that agency costs drive the 
voluntary formation of ACs. Bradbury (1990) argued that to form an AC, a 
company needs a sufficient number on the board of directors. However, a company 
with a small board has low coordination costs and is more likely to fulfil its 
monitoring tasks without forming an AC (Bushman, Chen, Engel, & Smith, 2004) 
or is less likely to delegate part of its responsibilities to an AC for efficiency reasons 
(Piot, 2004). Previous research supported these arguments and indicated that the 
board size is positively associated with the existence of an AC (Bradbury, 1990; 
Piot, 2004). For example, Bradbury (1990), using a sample of 135 firms listed on 
the New Zealand Stock Exchange, noticed that the AC plays an efficient monitoring 
rule as the number of the firm’s board members increases. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1: There is a positive association between the likelihood of 
voluntary AC formation and board size. 
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Board diligence, as measured by the frequency of board meetings, is 
another important measure of board monitoring power (Jensen, 1993). Mangena and 
Tauringana (2008) argued that companies with more frequent board meetings are 
likely to perform better than companies with less frequent meetings. Frequent board 
meetings improve monitoring quality (Ntim, 2009) and create and strengthen the 
relationships between directors (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Thus, companies with 
more board meetings may be more likely to have effective ACs (Raghunandan & 
Rama, 2007). Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the likelihood of 
voluntary AC formation and board diligence. 
 
Ownership Structure 
 
Variations in ownership structure have been identified as one of the primary 
reasons for differences in corporate governance across countries (Li, 1995). 
Agency theory argues that because of their typically larger holdings, institutional 
investors play a significant role in the corporate governance practices of the firms 
that they invest in compared to individual investors. Therefore, institutional 
investors have a greater incentive to observe management behaviour and prevent 
managerial expropriation of shareholders' interests. In addition, institutional 
investors (as large blockholders) have more resources and incentives to actively 
monitor management than small investors (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Ping & 
Wing, 2011) or some board members who may have little investment in the firm 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Finally, institutional investors have greater expertise 
and can monitor management at a lower cost than individual shareholders 
(Pound, 1988). Feldmann and Schwarzkopf (2003) found that the presence of 
institutional shareholders is positively associated with a set of sound corporate 
governance mechanisms such as the proportion of external directors, turnover of 
the board members and the establishment of an AC. Pucheta and De Fuentes 
(2007) suggested that the existence of institutional investors on the board of 
directors will encourage voluntary formation of ACs. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to expect that institutional investors have a significant influence on 
the voluntary formation of ACs as a key corporate governance mechanism. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H3: There is a positive association between the likelihood of 
voluntary AC formation and the percentage of shares held by 
institutional investors. 
 
Foreign ownership acts as a monitoring mechanism for management's 
behaviour and improves corporate governance in emerging markets (Bekaert, & 
Harvey, 2002). Foreign shareholders are usually more vulnerable to expropriation 
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risk from local shareholders and/or management than local investors. Local 
investors have an information advantage relative to their foreign counterparts, 
who are geographically separated from management, due to relatively easier 
access to firm relevant information (Coval & Moskowitz, 2001; Ivković & 
Weisbenner, 2005). To reduce agency conflicts between local investors and/or 
management, on the one hand, and foreign investors, on the other hand, and to 
boost confidence among foreign investors to invest in a particular firm, effective 
corporate governance mechanisms are needed (Bushman & Smith, 2003). 
Hallward-Driemeier (2001) reported that firms with a high percentage of shares 
held by foreign investors are expected to be more effective and to have better 
corporate governance than those with a lower percentage or without foreign 
ownership. Due to the risks associated with foreign investing, previous studies 
reported that foreign investors prefer not to invest in emerging markets due to 
both poor corporate governance and weak transparency (Banz & Clough, 2002; 
Gibson, 2003). However, Mangena and Tauringana (2007) documented a positive 
relationship between the percentage of shares held by foreign shareholders and 
the presence of ACs. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H4: There is a positive association between the likelihood of 
voluntary AC formation and the percentage of shares held by 
foreign investors. 
 
External Auditor  
 
Previous literature has identified a large audit firm as being one of the Big Four 
international audit firms (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Glaum & Street, 2003). 
Because large international audit firms are usually supported by more technical 
experts and are more concerned for their reputation than small local auditors, 
they tend to associate with clients that have effective corporate governance. 
Therefore, large external audit firms are more likely to deliver high quality audit 
service (DeAngelo, 1981; Palmrose, 1988) and to ask firms to establish ACs to 
follow best practices. In this regard, Eichenseher and Shields (1985) found that 
the existence of an AC is positively related with having a large independent 
auditor. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H5: There is a positive association between the likelihood of 
voluntary AC formation and the external auditor type. 
 
Firm Size 
 
A number of studies have documented that corporate firm size has a positive 
association with internal monitoring (Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 
2007; Guest, 2009). Because large firms face more information asymmetry and 
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higher vulnerability to agency conflicts (Jensen, 1986), they have greater demand 
for the adoption of sound governance mechanisms such as AC formation 
(Adams, 1997). Prior literature reported a positive association between firm size 
and AC formation (Piot, 2004; Firth et al., 2007; Benzing, Leach, & McGee, 
2011). One explanation for this finding suggests that large companies tend to 
establish sound governance structures, including AC formation, to attract 
prospective investors in the capital market and to enhance the confidence of these 
investors. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H6: There is a positive association between the likelihood of 
voluntary AC formation and firm size. 
 
Financial Performance 
 
Corporate financial performance is another variable used in the literature to 
explain the extent of disclosure. Agency theory suggests that managers of 
profitable companies are more likely to disclose more information to provide 
assurance to investors and to support their continuation and compensation 
(Oyeler, Laswad, & Fisher, 2003). This suggestion implies that firms with higher 
firm performance show good corporate governance, and investors' trust grows. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H7: There is a positive association between the likelihood of 
voluntary AC formation and firm financial performance. 
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
 
The sample used in the current study includes non-bank companies listed in the 
Palestine Stock Exchange between 2010 and 2012. The sample represents the 
four non-banking sectors, namely manufacturing, service, insurance and 
investment firms. The banking sector is excluded because it is subject to the 
PMA governance code, which is different from the PCMA code that applies to 
the other four sectors. The PMA code requires all banks to have ACs. Data were 
collected from the annual reports of the selected companies as well as from the 
annual company guides issued by the PSE during the period between 2010 and 
2012. As of 31 December 2012, there were 48 listed firms in the PSE, with a 
market capitalisation of US$ 2,859,140,375. These firms include 9 banks and 
financial service companies, 7 insurance companies, 13 service companies, 8 
investment companies, and 11 manufacturing companies. Initially, all of the 39 
non-bank listed companies were included in the sample. However, 7 firms were 
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subsequently excluded because they did not have complete records for the data 
related to the variables used in the study. Thus, the final sample consists of 96 
observations for 32 firms during the three-year period. 
 
Variables 
 
The dependent variable is the voluntary establishment of the AC, which has a 
value equal to one if the firm has voluntarily established an AC and 0 otherwise. 
The independent variables include a set of corporate governance mechanisms and 
the firm characteristics: board size, board diligence, institutional ownership, 
foreign ownership, external auditor type, firm size, and firm profitability. The 
independent variables used in the current study, their proxies and their expected 
directions are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Independent variables in the model 
 
Variable Measurement Expected 
 BDSIZE Board Size: The total number of board directors. + 
MEET Diligence: Number of board meetings held in the year. + 
INSTIT Institutional Ownership: Percentage of ordinary shares held by institutional investors.  + 
FORGN Foreign Ownership: Percentage of ordinary shares held by foreign investors. + 
AUDIT External Auditor: Dummy, 1 is given to the big four audit firm and 0 otherwise. + 
SIZE Firm size: measured by the natural logarithm of total market capitalisation. + 
ROA Financial performance: Net income divided by the total assets at the end of the year. + 
 
Methodology 
 
In this study, the logistic regression model will be used to examine the effects of 
the seven independent variables listed in Table 1 on the likelihood of establishing 
a voluntary AC. To account for the panel nature of the data, in particular, the 
individual company heterogeneity, a random effects logit model will be 
employed. 
 
Let πi represent the probability that the ith company has established an AC 
(i.e., ADCOMi =1), and let the term 𝜋𝑖
1−𝜋𝑖
 be the odds of establishing an AC. 
Therefore, the random effects logit model may be expressed as: 
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Logit(πi)=𝑙𝑙 �
𝜋𝑖
1−𝜋𝑖
�= β0i + β1BDSIZE + β2MEET + β3INSTIT + β4FORGN + 
β5AUDIT + β6SIZE + β7ROA + ε 
 
where β0i is the random intercept, β1 to β7 are the model parameters, and ε is a 
random error. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 gives the descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study 
over the 2010–2012 period. As shown in the table, the percentage of companies 
with ACs has doubled (19% to 38%) over the 2010–2012 period. The average 
number of board members and the average number of meetings were constant at 
9 and 5, respectively. Over the three-year period, approximately half of the 
companies had an external auditor. Moreover, there were no notable changes in 
the ownership structures over the 2010–2012 period, and the average percentages 
of institutional and foreign ownership were approximately 48% and 27%, 
respectively. Similarly, firm size, represented by the logarithm, showed no 
significant changes over the period.  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for 2010–2012 pooled data (n = 96) 
    
Variable Year Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
ADCOM 2010 0 1 0.19 0.397 
 2011 0 1 0.31 0.471 
 2012 0 1 0.38 0.492 
 Pooled 0 1 0.29 0.457 
BDSIZE 2010 5 14 9.03 2.102 
 2011 5 14 9.03 1.926 
 2012 5 15 9.00 2.314 
 Pooled 5 15 9.02 2.098 
MEET 2010 1 13 5.22 2.268 
 2011 1 10 5.09 1.573 
 2012 1 7 5.53 1.319 
 Pooled 1 13 5.28 1.757 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table 2. (continued) 
 
Variable Year Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
INSTIT 2010 0 100 46 32 
 2011 0 100 49 34 
 2012 0 100 48 33 
 Pooled 0 100 48 33 
FORGN 2010 0 83 28 30 
 2011 0 87 27 29 
 2012 0 86 27 30 
 Pooled 0 87 27 29 
AUDIT 2010 0 1 0.50 0.508 
 2011 0 1 0.53 0.507 
 2012 0 1 0.50 0.508 
 Pooled 0 1 0.51 0.503 
SIZE 2010 13.51 20.70 16.605 1.363 
 2011 13.51 20.71 16.561 1.399 
 2012 13.26 20.68 16.480 1.457 
 Pooled 13.26 20.71 16.549 1.390 
ROA 2010 –0.17 0.178 0.022 0.089 
 2011 –0.194 0.158 0.005 0.085 
 2012 –0.199 0.184 0.013 0.075 
 Pooled –0.199 0.184 0.013 0.083 
 
The correlation coefficients for the dependent and independent variables 
are presented in Table 3. The results indicate that companies with diligent boards, 
higher foreign ownership and a big four external auditor are more likely to have 
an AC. Notably, there are no high correlations among the independent variables, 
and hence there are no concerns about multicollinearity. 
 
Table 3 
Pearson correlation coefficients 
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
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Random Effects Logit Model Analysis 
 
Table 4 gives the results of the random effects logit model for the probability of 
voluntarily establishing an audit committee. Based on the likelihood-ratio test, 
the intra-class correlation coefficient (0.546) for the model is highly significant 
(χ2 = 5.45, p-value = 0.010). This result indicates the importance of the panel-
level variation component in the model and supports the preference for the 
random effects logit model over the pooled logit model (Rodríguez & Elo, 2003). 
Moreover, as the Wald Chi Square test indicates, the fitted model is moderately 
significant at the 10% level (χ2 = 12.46, p-value = 0.0863). Furthermore, the 
model explained between 23% (McFadden R-square) and 30% (Nagelkerke R-
square) of the variation in the voluntary formation of audit committee. 
 
Table 4 
Random-effects logistic regression model with ADCOM as dependent variable 
 
Regression Coefficients 
Variable B z p-value Odds Ratio 
Constant –14.040 –2.21 0.027 0.00 
BDSIZE 0.405 1.34 0.180 1.50 
MEET 0.973 2.29 0.022 2.65 
INSTIT –0.041 –1.93 0.053 0.96 
FORGN 0.078 3.09 0.002 1.08 
AUDIT 2.673 2.03 0.043 14.48 
SIZE 0.080 0.26 0.793 1.08 
ROA –9.615 –1.33 0.183 0.00 
Model Diagnostics 
Intra-class correlation (ρ): 0.546 
Likelihood Ratio Test: χ2 = 5.45, p-value = 0.010 
WaldChi Square Test: χ2 = 12.46, p-value = 0.0863 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2: 0.226 
Nagelkerke Pseudo R2: 0.304 
 
Additionally, the aforementioned intra-class correlation for the model 
indicates a moderately high correlation between a company's tendency to 
establish an audit committee in the different years. Finally, as shown in Table 5, 
the model correctly classified 81.3% of companies. 
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Table 5 
Classification table of formation of AC 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
Percentage Correct 
Yes No 
Yes 14 14 50 
No 4 64 94 
Overall percentage   81.3 
 
As indicated in Table 4, the significant variables at a 5% level in 
descending order based on the odds ratio (OR) are AUDIT, MEET and FORGN. 
Moreover, a significant effect from INSTIT has been observed at a 10% level. 
The results indicate that the companies that hire big international audit firms are 
more likely (OR = 14.48) to have an audit committee compared to those who are 
audited by local audit firms or small audit offices. Additionally, for every 
additional meeting the board holds annually, the odds of forming an audit 
committee will likely double (OR = 2.65). Moreover, when the percentage of 
foreign ownership increases by 1%, the odds of forming an audit committee will 
slightly increase (OR = 1.08). However, as institutional ownership increases, it 
becomes less likely that the company will form an audit committee (OR = 0.96). 
 
This result is consistent with agency theory. According to agency theory, 
foreign investors are more likely to depend on effective corporate governance 
structures (such as the formation of an AC), which constrains management and/or 
local shareholders from expropriating other (foreign) investors. Managers of 
firms with a high percentage of foreign ownership tend to run their firms 
effectively to reduce agency costs and protect foreign investors who are 
geographically separated from firm (Schipper, 1981). This finding indicates that 
foreign investors are able to bring global best governance practices (such as ACs) 
to Palestinian firms that may reduce information asymmetry and agency costs. 
The result is not surprising because it is in line with findings obtained in prior 
literature (Mangena & Tauringana, 2007). 
 
As predicted, a positive and significant association has been reported 
between board diligence, as measured by the board's meeting frequency (MEET), 
and the existence of an AC. This result also lends support to agency theory, 
which suggests that boards that meet more frequently can effectively advise and 
monitor management and hence enhance corporate governance. This finding is 
also in line with Raghunandan and Rama (2007), who found that the boards that 
meet more frequently are more likely to have effective ACs. 
 
Contrary to expectations, regression results indicated that institutional 
ownership has a marginally significant (at the 10% level) negative influence on 
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the formation of an AC. This result does not support the agency theory 
assumption that institutional investors are expected to mitigate agency costs and 
enhance corporate performance. This finding is also contrary to findings from 
some earlier studies suggesting that institutional investors have more influence 
than individual investors in improving corporate governance structures in general 
(Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005) and in the formation of ACs in particular (Pucheta-
Martínez & De Fuentes, 2007). It is very likely that firms with a higher level of 
ownership concentrated in the hands of institutional investors will be less 
concerned about agency problems. Institutional investors can exploit their power 
as blockholders to request information directly from company management and 
thus to maximise their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders who 
cannot closely monitor managers' behaviour (Köhler, 2009). In this case, the 
possibility of forcing management to voluntarily form an AC to reflect the 
company's commitment to sound corporate governance practices is remote.  
 
 As predicted, a significantly positive relationship has been reported 
between using a large external auditor and the voluntary formation of an AC. 
This result supports agency theory by suggesting that large external audit firms 
encourage their clients to adopt active governance mechanisms such as 
voluntarily establishing ACs to regulate conflicts of interest and mitigate agency 
costs. This finding concurs with findings from earlier studies (Eichenseher & 
Shields, 1985).  
 
Although both the board size (BDSIZE) and the firm size (SIZE) 
variables have been found to be positively related to the establishment of an AC, 
this association, however, is not significant. Thus, these findings lend only partial 
support to agency theory, which argues that large firms and firms with a greater 
number of directors are more likely to establish ACs to mitigate the high agency 
costs they experience due to complexity as well as communication and 
coordination problems. These results are contrary to some earlier findings that 
documented a significant and positive relationship between board size and the 
voluntary formation of the AC (Bradbury, 1990; Piot, 2004; Firth et al., 2007; 
Huang, Zhang, Deis, & Moffitt, 2009; Benzing et al., 2011). 
 
It is worth noting that we have performed several other regression 
models to check the robustness of the used model including the population-
averaged logit model, the random effects probit model, and the population-
averaged probit model. Generally, the results of these models were qualitatively 
similar to and consistent with those presented in Table 4.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This paper expands the limited knowledge in the company audit committee 
literature about Arab and Middle Eastern countries in general and Palestine in 
particular. From an agency theory perspective, we have investigated eight 
potential determinants of voluntary audit committee formation among the non-
bank firms listed on the Palestine Stock Exchange (PSE). The main finding is that 
agency theory appears to be a powerful theory for explaining the voluntary 
creation of audit committees in a small emerging economy such as Palestine. The 
study suggests that the voluntary formation of ACs in a high agency cost 
environment such as Palestine complements other corporate governance 
measures such as board characteristics, quality of the external auditor and foreign 
ownership structure in reducing agency problems. Therefore, agency theory, 
which has gained support in developed and industrialised emerging economies, 
can also be employed to address corporate governance problems in small 
emerging markets with different institutional settings. 
 
To strengthen the audit committee’s role as a financial monitor, the 
current study recommends that policy makers and the Palestinian Capital Market 
Authority (PCMA) mandate the establishment of ACs by all listed companies and 
require that the composition, operation and responsibility of these committees be 
in line with international best practices. 
 
The current study has two limitations. First, because of the small sample 
size, the findings – although significant – are not generalisable with a high degree 
of confidence. Second, the primary focus of this study is on the determinants of 
just the formation of an AC and not on the factors that influence the effectiveness 
of the AC. Many researchers have argued that the mere creation of an audit 
committee does not necessarily imply that these committees possess a certain 
level of effectiveness (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998) or that sound governance has 
been achieved by the firm (Turley & Zaman, 2004). In our study, very few firms 
disclosed information about their AC characteristics because the PCMA code 
only encourages the listed companies to form ACs and does not require any 
disclosure related to AC characteristics. Thus, direct measures of AC 
effectiveness are not available.  
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